






































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 





and THOMAS JOSEPH ZANE, 
Defendants. 
 Case No.:  3:17-cv-02215-BEN-JLB 
 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
  
Plaintiffs Dr. Christopher Garnier and Ms. Kimberly Garnier (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”) are parents of children in the Poway Unified School District (“PUSD”).  
Defendants Ms. Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and Mr. Thomas Joseph Zane (collectively, 
“Defendants”) are members of the PUSD Board of Trustees.  Plaintiffs allege Defendants 
blocked them from commenting on their Facebook and Twitter pages, depriving them of 
their federal constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Compl., ECF No. 1.  
Plaintiffs also allege violation of their state constitutional rights.  Id. 
This case is one of a growing number applying the First Amendment to the 
activities of elected officials on social media platforms.  See, e.g., Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding 
President Donald Trump’s Twitter account to be a designated public forum and that 
































blocking users was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Davison v. Randall, 912 
F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that a public official who used a Facebook page as a 
tool of her office exercised state action when blocking a constituent); Robinson v. Hunt 
Cty., Texas, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that a government official’s act of 
blocking a constituent from an official government social media page was 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Faison v. Jones, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (E.D. 
Cal. 2020) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and ordering 
defendant county sheriff to unblock plaintiffs on his official Facebook page by finding 
the relevant page was a public forum); Campbell v. Reisch, 367 F. Supp. 3d 987 (W.D. 
Mo. 2019) (denying motion to dismiss and finding that defendant state legislator was 
acting under color of law when she blocked plaintiff from her official Twitter account); 
Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant state governor from blocking plaintiffs on 
Facebook by finding the relevant page was not a public forum).   
The Court conducted a two-day bench trial on Plaintiffs’ claims on September 21 
and 22, 2020.  The following is a brief procedural background of this case, along with the 
Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law from that trial.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).  
As explained below, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs’ on their Section 1983 claim.  
Because Plaintiff did not offer evidence or argue the state law claim, the Court declines to 
find Defendants’ conduct violated the California Constitution. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 30, 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging one claim for violation of federal 
constitutional rights and one claim for violation of state constitutional rights, seeking 
general and punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. 1  Compl., ECF 
No. 1, 5.  Prior to the case’s transfer to this Court, Defendants moved for summary 
                                               
1  Plaintiffs initially also named PUSD in this lawsuit but voluntarily dismissed the 
district on January 26, 2018.  ECF No. 9. 
































judgment on all claims.  Mot., ECF No. 34.  On September 26, 2019, Judge Thomas J. 
Whelan issued an order granting Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ damages 
claim reasoning that damages were barred by qualified immunity.  Order, ECF No. 42, 
24.  Judge Whelan denied Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ requests for 
injunctive and declaratory relief.  Id. 
Following transfer, the case proceeded to a bench trial.  At the beginning of trial, 
the Court informed the Parties that it had reviewed Judge Whelan’s order and that it 
adopted the rulings set forth in the order.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 5:21-24.  To formalize 
those rulings, the Court finds Defendants: (1) are entitled to qualified immunity for 
Plaintiffs’ damages claims; (2) acted under color of state law in blocking Plaintiffs from 
their social media pages; and (3) created designated public forums on their social media 
pages.  The reasoning for these determinations is set forth in Judge Whelan’s order, 
which the Court adopts for these findings of fact and conclusions of law except for the 
ruling on standing.  See Order, ECF No. 42. 
The exception for the standing ruling is necessary because the evidence presented 
at trial indicated that Zane may have “unblocked” Kimberly Garnier before trial.  “The 
Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine of mootness requires that the ‘requisite 
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must 
continue throughout its existence (mootness).’”  McKercher v. Morrison, Case No. 18-
cv-1054-JTM-BLM, 2019 WL 1098935, at * 2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (quoting 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68, n.22 (1997)).  Because the 
evidence received at trial regarding standing differed in some respects from the Parties’ 
claims in their briefing on the motion for summary judgment, the Court also makes 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each Plaintiff’s standing as to each 
Defendant’s alleged actions. 
Aside from the continuing analysis of standing, the remaining issue for trial was 
whether Plaintiffs’ comments and replies disrupted Defendants’ original posts on their 
social media pages, “because if [Plaintiffs’] comments did not disrupt the original posts, 
































then it is reasonable to infer that [Defendants’] claimed justification for blocking 
[Plaintiffs] was a pretext and that they actually blocked [Plaintiffs] because of the content 
of their comments.”  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 6:4-11. 
Plaintiffs claim that: (1) Defendants blocked them from posting on their social 
media pages; (2) Plaintiffs’ comments and replies prior to blocking did not disrupt 
Defendants’ original posts; and (3) the blocking was impermissibly content-based.  See 
generally Pls.’ Br., ECF No. 85.  Defendants argue that: (1) any blocking left open 
alternative channels of communication; (2) the blocking was content-neutral and 
narrowly tailored; and (3) as officials of the legislative branch, their social media 
accounts should be treated differently from those of executive branch officials.  See 
generally Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 84. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Following the testimony and exhibits received at trial, the Court makes the 
following findings of fact. 
A. Parties and Pages 
Plaintiffs Christopher Garnier and Kimberly Garnier are parents of children who 
are students in PUSD.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 87:20-23.  Defendants Michelle O’Connor-
Ratcliff and T.J. Zane are members of PUSD’s Board of Trustees.  Id. at 112:7; 153:1.  
Both Defendants were first elected in 2014, and both still serve on PUSD’s Board of 
Trustees.  Id. at 114:11; 153:5. 
Zane has a Facebook account and maintains at least two pages.  Id. at 112-115.  He 
has a personal profile page that he uses for family and friends as well as a public page he 
uses for campaigning and issues related to PUSD.  Id. at 113:25-114:20.  Zane created the 
public page in 2014.  Id. at 114:3-6.  Zane is the only administrator of the public page.  
Id. at 114:12-25.  Zane also has a Twitter account that he rarely uses but has interacted 
with Christopher Garnier on Twitter, which eventually led to an in-person meeting 
between the two.  Id. at 138:8-10.  Zane testified that Plaintiffs also posted on his 
personal and business Facebook pages, after which he blocked them from posting there.  
































Id. at 137:12-13.  Zane’s decision to block Plaintiffs on his personal and business 
Facebook pages is not at issue here. 
Like Zane, O’Connor-Ratcliff has a Facebook account.  Id. at 153:13.  She has 
both a personal page that she uses for family and friends as well as a public page she uses 
for campaigning and issues related to PUSD.  Id.  O’Connor-Ratcliff created her public 
page sometime before 2017.  Id.  Since 2017, O’Connor-Ratcliff has also used a Twitter 
account for PUSD and campaign purposes.  Id. at 184:6-8. 
O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane successfully created and published original social 
media content on Facebook and Twitter – known as “posts” and “tweets,” respectively – 
related to PUSD on their public Facebook pages Twitter feeds.  See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 4, 1; 
Ex. 5, 1-25; Ex. 6, 1-88; Ex. 7, 1; Defs.’ Ex. “U,” 25-130.  Neither O’Connor-Ratcliff nor 
Zane established rules of etiquette or decorum regulating how the public interacted with 
their social media accounts.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 115:6-9; 154:21-23. 
Defendants testified that they intended their Facebook and Twitter pages to be used 
in a “bulletin board” manner—providing one-way communication from themselves to 
their constituents.  See, e.g., id. at 130:10-16, 131:6-19, 133:11-12, 147:13-15, 148:7, 
168:15-16, 174:1-8, 185:16-19.  However, at least through 2017, both also used 
Facebook for interactive purposes by replying to comments on their posts from other 
constituents about PUSD issues.  See generally Pls.’ Exs. 3-4.  There is no evidence 
O’Connor-Ratcliff used Twitter for similar interactions because her Twitter feed shows 
only posts, not comments and replies to others.  Pls.’ Ex. 5.  Zane used Twitter to 
interact—indeed, even with Christopher Garnier.  He has not blocked Plaintiffs on 
Twitter. 
B. PUSD Boarding Meetings in the Physical World 
At public meetings of PUSD’s Board of Trustees, members of the public can 
express their views to board members.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 178:3-24.  Public 
comments may be made on any topic of the speaker’s choosing but do not allow for a 
response from members of the Board of Trustees.  Id. at 21:20; 179:1-8.  Public 
































comments are also limited to three minutes per speaker.  Id. at 178:7-12.  There are 
several members of the public who appear at each meeting and often press the same 
points.  Id. at 113:6-16.  PUSD does not have a policy prohibiting members of the public 
from appearing at subsequent meetings and repeatedly addressing the same issues to the 
Board.  Id. at 133:22.  Both Defendants testified that they do not leave the room during 
the public comment time, even when the comments they are hearing are repetitive.  Id. at 
154:4-20. 
C. Other Alternate Avenues of Communication 
Both Defendants testified that receiving feedback from constituents is an important 
part of their duties as Trustees.  In addition to the public comment portions of Board 
meetings discussed above, both Defendants maintain email addresses provided by PUSD 
that they use to conduct official business.  The PUSD Board of Trustees also has a policy 
for the public to make a complaint about a Trustee.  Id. at 58:6. 
Both Defendants testified that the public frequently uses in-person comments and 
their PUSD email addresses to contact them.  Id. at 134:16-18; 168:25.  O’Connor-
Ratcliff testified Plaintiffs emailed her PUSD email address 780 times.  Id. at 173:15.  
Plaintiffs testified that email messages sent to Defendants went unanswered or the 
recipient refused to talk or meet.  See, e.g., id. at 21:15-22:11, 89:21-90:5.  Christopher 
Garnier also submitted complaints about both Defendants pursuant to the Board of 
Trustees’ policy but received no response.  Id. at 58:2-24. 
However, Defendants never attempted to prevent Plaintiffs from speaking during 
the public comment period of a Board meeting and never attempted to prevent Plaintiffs 
from sending emails to their PUSD email addresses.  Moreover, Zane has even met with 
Christopher Garnier in-person on at least two occasions.  Id. at 138:6-7. 
D. Facebook Page and Twitter Account Functionality 
 
The crux of this case focuses on the alleged disruption of Defendants’ Facebook 
pages and Twitter feeds.  To analyze whether and how disruption on those platforms can 
































occur, an understanding of how the platforms display content is required.2 
On both Defendants’ public Facebook pages, Defendants, respectively, are the only 
people who can create original “posts.”  Id. at 115:17.  Nonetheless, members of the 
public are generally allowed to interact with the content Defendants post through 
“comments” and “reactions” on the Defendants’ original posts.  When accessing 
Defendants’ Facebook pages, Facebook automatically truncates lengthy posts, requiring a 
viewer interested in reading the full post to click a “See More” button beneath the 
truncated post.  See, e.g., Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 29:5-19,1 93:11-95:2; Pls.’ Ex. 3, 3 and 
19; and Defs.’ Ex. U, 150.  For viewers who have not clicked “See More” on the post, 
Facebook shows only the beginning of the post and only the most recent or most relevant 
comments.   
An illustration may be beneficial to the reader.  The picture below depicts a post 
made by O’Connor-Ratcliff on August 28, 2017.  O’Connor-Ratcliff’s post is long 
enough that a viewer is required to click “See More” to read her entire post. 
                                               
2  The Court notes its findings of fact here are limited by the evidence received at 
trial.  Other cases examining social media blocking have attempted to make similar 
descriptions of social media platforms’ functionality based on the evidence submitted in 
those cases, see, e.g., Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1007, but the Court is hesitant to adopt 
anything outside of the record in this case because the functionality of these platforms 
constantly changes, making adoption inappropriate for judicial notice. 

































Pls.’ Ex. 3, 3.  If a Facebook user wishes to skip past this post, she need only scroll past 
the truncated post, which takes a brief amount of time.  Indeed, as shown above, 
O’Connor-Ratcliff’s next post (dated August 26, 2017) is also visible on this screenshot. 
Lengthy comments are treated similarly to lengthy posts.  On Facebook, comments 
in response to a post appear below the post.  See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 3, 4-6; Pls.’ Ex. 6, 6 and 
































10.  There is no limit on the number of comments that can be made within a specific 
period of time, and the evidence produced at trial indicates such comments can be quite 
lengthy.  See generally, Defs.’ Ex. U.  To read a lengthy comment, the viewer must click 
“See More” on the truncated beginning of a comment.  Pls. Ex. 3, 75.  The individual 
viewer selects whether they will see the most recent or most relevant comments.  Trial 
Tr., ECF No. 80, 183:10-13. 
The picture below depicts a Facebook post shared by O’Connor-Ratcliff on August 
10, 2016.  There are thirteen reactions to the post using the “thumbs-up” symbol from 
other members of the public.  The picture displays the beginning of a lengthy comment 
on the post made by a non-party to this action.  A Facebook user must click “See More” 
to show any text beyond the truncated beginning of the comment.  In this instance, 
O’Connor-Ratcliff also replied to the comment. 
 
Pls.’ Ex. 6, 6. Again, if a Facebook user wishes to skip past this comment, she need only 
































scroll past the truncated comment, which takes a small amount of time. 
When a video is linked in a comment to a Post, the video does not play 
automatically when a Facebook user reads the comment.  Instead, the user must click a 
link to watch the video or can scroll past the comment containing the video link almost 
instantaneously.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 108:20-109:12.  The picture below depicts a 
Facebook post made by O’Connor-Ratcliff on May 24, 2015.  Below the post, Kimberly 
Garnier posted a comment containing video link.  Christopher Garnier also posted a 
comment containing a link. 
 
Defs.’ Ex. U, 10.  Plaintiffs’ comments are light in color because O’Connor-Ratcliff 
































“hid” those comments on her page, discussed further below.  Scrolling past these video 
link comments is quick and straightforward. 
Zane testified that because of this truncation as well as Facebook’s other features 
designed to streamline a page’s appearance, even repeated comments only had “a net 
effect of slightly pushing down anything that I would have put up there.”  Trial Tr., ECF 
No. 80, 133:15-17.  Scrolling past even numerous, repeated comments or links to videos 
would take minimal time due to Facebook’s truncation of comments.  Id. at 94:22.  As 
quickly as the user can click his finger, he can disregard the truncated comments.  Id. at 
109:9-10.   
Any Facebook user may comment on a post on a public page such as those used by 
Defendants.  Id. at 115:20.  The comment does not necessarily relate to the original post.  
Id. at 81:14-20.  When a person comments, the page administrator for that page may 
leave a comment visible to other Facebook users.  Id. at 120:4-19.  The page 
administrator can also delete a comment, removing it entirely from appearing beneath the 
post, or “hide” the comment.  Id.  The “hide” feature allows a page administrator to make 
comments on posts invisible to other viewers.  Id.  The only people who can view a 
comment that has been hidden are the page administrator and the person who posted the 
hidden comment.  Id.  Another Facebook user viewing a post would not see any hidden 
comments.  Id. at 121:1-5. 
In addition to deleting or hiding individual comments, Facebook also allows page 
administrators to block people from posting on their page.  While users generally may 
respond to a post with a comment—whether germane or not to the post—or by making a 
non-verbal reaction, such as by “liking” a post or give a “thumbs up” emoticon, a blocked 
user cannot comment or make a non-verbal reaction.  See, e.g., Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 
ECF No. 80, 186:8-188:2; Pls.’ Ex. 3, 2 (showing “thumbs up” and smiley-face 
emoticons to the left of “16” reactions).  Instead, a blocked user can only view the public 
Facebook page. Id. 
On Twitter, the equivalent of an original post is called a “tweet.”  A Twitter user’s 
































tweets are displayed on a “feed,” similar to how a Facebook user’s posts are displayed on 
her page.  The pictures below depict the top of O’Connor-Ratcliff’s Twitter feed as of 
October 26, 2017.  As can be seen, when viewing a user’s feed, replies to the user’s 
tweets are not visible.  Instead, a user must click on a specific tweet to view replies to that 
tweet.  Thus, a user’s ability to “disrupt” another user’s Twitter feed—the page she 
wishes to display to other users—is minimal because replies are only visible when 
clicking on a particular tweet. 
 

































Pls.’ Ex. 5, 1-2. 
On Twitter, a user may also block another user.  Blocking prevents the blocked 
user from seeing the blocker’s Twitter feed and replying to the blocker’s tweets.  In other 
words, the blocked user cannot see any of the content posted by the blocker while logged 
into his Twitter account or interact with the blocker on the site. 
































E. Plaintiffs’ Interactions with Defendants’ Pages and Accounts 
Christopher Garnier began posting on Defendants’ Facebook pages when he 
believed they were not satisfactorily responding to his emails and other communications.  
Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 37:14-18.  None of Plaintiffs’ comments used profanity or 
threatened physical harm, and almost all related to PUSD.  Id. at 39:1-9.  Plaintiffs’ 
comments were not commercial in nature.  Id. at 39:11. 
However, Plaintiffs acknowledged their posts were often repetitious.  Id. at 41:4; 
100-103.  On Facebook, Christopher Garnier made the same comment on forty-two posts 
made by O’Connor-Ratcliff.  Id. at 180:16.  On another occasion, Christopher Garnier 
posted the same reply to every tweet O’Connor-Ratcliff posted within approximately ten 
minutes.  Id. at 176:18.  This involved repeating the same reply 226 times.  Id.  As 
discussed above, these replies would only be visible by (1) visiting Christopher Garnier’s 
Twitter feed or (2) clicking on a tweet on O’Connor-Ratcliff’s feed to which Christopher 
Garnier replied.  For example, looking at O’Connor-Ratcliff’s Twitter feed, the following 
tweet appears from October 13, 2017. 
 
Pls.’ Ex. 5, 3.  A user can see that there is one reply to this tweet, indicated by the “1” 
































next to the cartoon dialogue icon, but cannot see that reply on O’Connor-Ratcliff’s feed. 
Moreover, not all of Plaintiffs’ comments were the same.  O’Connor-Ratcliff’s 
documentary evidence shows Christopher Garnier posting more than 20 unique 
comments and Kimberly Garnier posting more than 15 unique comments in response to 
O’Connor-Ratcliff’s original Facebook posts.  See Defs.’ Ex. U, 25-130.  Plaintiffs 
testified they repeated comments because they wanted to reach other Facebook users who 
might only look at one particular post made by Defendants.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 
107:2-7.  By repeating their message on each post, Plaintiffs reasoned, they would raise 
the issues that mattered to them involving PUSD to a broader audience.  Id. at 102:17-
103:11. 
Assessing the full scope of these comments’ disruption is difficult because Zane 
deleted some of Plaintiffs’ comments on his Facebook page while O’Connor-Ratcliff 
“hid” or deleted others.  In addition, the Parties’ exhibits generally show the pages as 
they appeared in 2017 when the suit was filed.  More recent screenshots were not 
submitted in evidence.  Nonetheless, Zane testified that deleting comments was not 
onerous and that he did so to ensure his Facebook page had a “streamlined” appearance.  
Id. at 133:13-21.  On some of O’Connor-Ratcliff’s Facebook posts, she “hid” Plaintiffs’ 
comments and still replied to comments made by other members of the public.  See, e.g., 
Defs.’ Ex. “U,” 26, 28, 30 and 32; and Trial Tr., ECF No. 80 189:24-190:12. 
F. Use of Word Filters 
In general, Facebook allows a page administrator to block a particular user from 
commenting on his page but does not allow a page administrator to entirely block 
comments from all other Facebook users.  Though not addressed extensively at trial, the 
reasoning for Facebook’s policy is intuitive: Facebook is a social media platform, not a 
website designed for the one-way presentation of information to a reader.  It seeks 
interaction between users, not just dissemination of content to a recipient. 
However, after this suit was filed, Facebook created a new feature that allows a 
page administrator to use word filters.  Word filters are designed to allow a page 
































administrator to moderate potentially offensive content on their page.  If a page 
administrator adds a word to the filter, a comment including that word will not appear as 
a comment on any post.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 116:1-15. 
Zane began using word filters on his page in December 2018.  Zane testified that 
his intent is not to limit only potentially offensive content.  Id.  Instead, he seeks to 
preclude all comments on his public page.  Id.  To accomplish this intent, he added more 
than 2,000 words to his word filter.  Id.  The words include basic words likely to appear 
in any comment, such as “he, she, it, [and] that,” to ensure all comments are filtered out 
from his page.  Id.  O’Connor-Ratcliff has also adopted word filters, though uses a much 
smaller set of words.  Id. at 160:24-25.  Her intent, likewise, is now to eliminate all 
comments and use her public Facebook page as a “bulletin board.”  Id. at 168:16. 
G. Blocking 
Christopher Garnier testified that in October 2017, he was blocked from posting on 
Zane’s public Facebook page and remains so blocked today.  Id. at 45:4; 56:1-2.  Zane 
denies this, stating he never blocked Christopher Garnier on his public Facebook page – 
only on his personal and business pages.  Id. at 117:7.  Zane also testified that he has 
deleted specific comments and used word filters, discussed above, attempting to prevent 
all Facebook users from commenting on his posts.  Id. at 117:8-20.  He stated that as 
Facebook’s features have evolved, his use of the platform evolved as well.  He now tries 
to prevent any comments on his page by using an extensive word filter instead of deleting 
individual comments.  Id. at 117:19-25.  The Parties did not address whether blocking an 
individual from one page automatically blocks that same person from other pages run by 
the same page administrator, but this could likely be the case here. 
Christopher Garnier and Zane offered directly conflicting testimony.  While dated, 
the documentary evidence supports the conclusion that Zane blocked Christopher Garnier 
from his public Facebook page.  Christopher Garnier appears unable to comment on any 
post made by Zane on his page, see Pls.’ Ex. 15, which is consistent with what a blocked 
user would experience on a Facebook page.  Accordingly, the Court finds that although 
































Zane may not have acted with the intent to block Christopher Garnier, the result of his 
action is that he has blocked and continues to block Christopher Garnier on Facebook. 
With respect to Kimberly Garnier, the evidence is different.  Kimberly Garnier 
testified that at the time she filed suit, Zane blocked her from posting on his Facebook 
page.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 88:17-18.  Kimberly Garnier testified, however, that only 
days before trial Zane appeared to unblock her from his Facebook page.  Id. at 92:10-11.  
As discussed above, Zane denies he blocked anyone from his public Facebook page.  Id. 
at 117:7.  Where there is no dispute, the Court readily finds Zane is not currently 
blocking Kimberly Garnier on Facebook. 
Plaintiffs do not allege Zane has ever blocked either of them on Twitter.  As such, 
the Court makes no finding in this regard. 
The evidence regarding O’Connor-Ratcliff is much clearer.  O’Connor-Ratcliff 
reported Plaintiffs’ comments on her page to Facebook on two occasions.  Id. at 175:2-4.  
A representative from Facebook informed O’Connor-Ratcliff that they were looking into 
the matter, but Facebook did not end up taking any action against Plaintiffs.  The 
representative also recommended O’Connor-Ratcliff block Plaintiffs on the platform, 
which she did.  Id. at 175:5-6.  O’Connor-Ratcliff has also blocked Christopher Garnier 
on Twitter.  Id. at 193:25.  She has not unblocked either Christopher Garnier or Kimberly 
Garnier on those platforms.  Id. at 45:11; 155:11. 
H. Rationale 
Zane testified the content of Christopher Garnier’s posts were “not particularly” of 
any concern to him.  Id. at 132:25; 133:1-7.  Instead, Zane’s issue with Plaintiffs’ posts 
on his social media page was the alleged disruption and “spamming” nature of the 
comments, which went against Zane’s intent to have the page “just be very streamlined” 
in a “bulletin board nature.”  Id. at 133:11-12.  Zane stated he never understood 
Christopher Garnier’s decision to repeat comments beneath each post Zane made.  Id. at 
137:23-25.  He testified that a comment repeated below each post “wasn’t what I wanted 
for the page, so that’s why I chose the settings that I did.”  Id. at 138:1-2.  
































Likewise, O’Connor-Ratcliff testified her reason for blocking Plaintiffs on her 
Facebook page and Christopher Garnier on Twitter was the repetition, not content, of his 
posts.  Id. at 180:20.  She testified that she has received negative comments from other 
members of the public on her Facebook page but has not blocked them.  Id. at 194:23-
195:6.  The record also reflects O’Connor-Ratcliff frequently responded to positive 
comments on her page with “thumbs-up” reactions and responses such as “Thank you for 
the kind words,” id. at 186:8-188:22, but does not show evidence that Plaintiffs were 
blocked due to the content (vice repetition) of their comments. 
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs’ federal claim arises out of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to which “[e]very 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  To state a 
claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a right secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged deprivation was 
committed by a person acting under color of state law.  Id.; see also West v. Atkins, 487 
U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020).  “Section 1983 ‘is not 
itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating 
federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”  Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).   
As discussed below, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs have demonstrated the 
requisite elements for a Section 1983 claim, namely: (1) state action, as was determined 
prior to trial, see Order, ECF No. 42; and (2) deprivation of a constitutional right.  Before 
turning to the claim, however, the Court briefly addresses standing. 
A. Plaintiffs have Standing for their claims 
While the Parties’ briefs assume Defendants blocked Plaintiffs on Facebook and 
O’Connor-Ratcliff blocked Christopher Garnier on Twitter, the evidence presented at 
trial requires the Court to closely examine this issue. 
































The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III, § 2, of the Constitution 
to “Cases” or “Controversies.  Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 64.  This requires a litigant to show 
“an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized,” as well 
as “actual or imminent.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(internal quotations omitted).  “To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an 
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the 
complaint was filed.’”  Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 67 (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 
395, 401 (1975)).  However, “[i]t is undisputed that as a general rule voluntary cessation 
of challenged conduct moots a case . . . only if it is absolutely clear that the allegedly 
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”  Carlson v. United 
Academics – AAUP/AFT/APEA AFL-CIO, 265 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
Here, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants.  Compl., 
ECF No. 1.  An injunction issued by this Court would require Defendants to unblock 
Plaintiffs on Facebook and would require O’Connor-Ratcliff to unblock Christopher 
Garnier on Twitter.  However, there is evidence that Zane unblocked Kimberly Garnier 
on Facebook shortly before trial.  Accordingly, the general rule would suggest that 
Kimberly Garnier’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Zane are moot.  
See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 67; see also Wagschal v. Skoufis, 442 F. Supp. 3d 612, 622 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief mooted 
because defendant state senator unblocked plaintiff) and McKercher, 2019 WL 1098935, 
at *3 (dismissing claims as moot where defendant added plaintiff on Facebook as a friend 
during the pendency of litigation, allowing plaintiff to post on defendant’s Facebook 
page).  Nonetheless, because Zane unblocked Kimberly Garnier only days before trial, 
the Court finds it is not absolutely clear that Zane could not block Kimberly Garnier 
again.  See Carlson, 265 F.3d at 786.  Accordingly, the Court concludes Kimberly 
Garnier has standing for her claims against Zane. 
As discussed above, the Court finds that both Defendants blocked and continue to 
































block Christopher Garnier on Facebook, that O’Connor-Ratcliff blocked and continues to 
block Christopher Garnier on Twitter, and that O’Connor-Ratcliff blocked and continues 
to block Kimberly Garnier on Facebook.  These claims therefore involve an actual 
controversy and the Court’s analysis on these alleged Section 1983 violations proceeds 
below. 
B. Defendants’ Conduct Constitutes State Action 
First, although not alleged in the complaint, Plaintiffs have filed suit against 
Defendants on the basis that their actions qualify as state action.  Judge Whelan’s order 
on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment already concluded that Defendants acted 
under color of state law, satisfying the first element for a Section 1983 action.   See 
generally ECF No. 42.  Despite Judge Whelan’s ruling, Defendants noted at the 
beginning of trial that this case involved a question of “whether there was state action.”  
Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 13:8-12.  Although recognizing that Judge Whelan had found state 
action when denying their motion for summary judgment, they intended to present 
evidence on that issue to preserve the record for appeal.  Id.  At the conclusion of trial, 
the Court stated that it recognized a difference between this case and the Knight and 
Morgan cases, both of which involved an executive, because unlike the legislators here 
who have regular meetings at which the public can appear and provide comment, the 
executives in Knight and Morgan lacked such a forum.  Id. at 199:7-11.  The Court noted 
that in this case, Plaintiffs could come into a Board meeting and “express the very same 
views . . . that they could . . . on Facebook or Twitter.”  Id. at 199:1-6.  As a result, the 
Court asked the Parties to address whether the fact that Defendants’ actions were taken 
outside of a meeting could preclude those actions from being considered state action 
sufficient to allow a Section 1983 action to proceed. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ status as legislators vice executive branch 
officials does not change the analysis of whether Defendants acted under color of state 
law in blocking Plaintiffs.  Pls.’ Br., ECF No. 86, 9-11.  Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt 
a “totality of the circumstances” test for determining state action, citing the Fourth 
































Circuit’s decision in Davison.  Id. (citing 912 F.3d 666).  Defendants argue extensively 
that they did not act under color of state law because they are members of the legislative 
branch and cannot take official action outside of a meeting of their legislative body.  
Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 84, 13-15 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 54950 et seq.).  On these 
grounds, they attempt to distinguish other cases that have found similar conduct to violate 
the First Amendment.  Id. at 14.   
As stated above, the Court adopts the reasoning and conclusions articulated by 
Judge Whelan in his order on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that “[t]he 
content of [Defendants’] posts, considered in totality, went beyond their policy 
preferences or information about their campaigns for reelection.”   ECF No. 42 at 14:2-4.  
Because Defendants “could not have used their social media pages in the way they did 
but for their positions on PUSD’s Board, their blocking of [Plaintiffs] satisfies the state-
action requirement for a section 1983 claim.”  Id. at 14.  Further, “the content of many of 
their posts was possible because they were ‘clothed with the authority of state law.’”  Id. 
(citing Davison, 912 F.3d at 679).  Finally, other recent cases addressing blocking on 
social media have found legislators to be acting under color of state law in making 
blocking decisions.  See, e.g., Davison, 912 F.3d at 680 (county board chair); Campbell, 
367 F. Supp. 3d at 994 (state representative); and Felts v. Reed, Case No. 20-cv-821-
JAR, 2020 WL 7041809, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2020) (municipal alderman).  For these 
reasons, the Court concludes Defendants acted under color of state law despite 
Defendants’ positions as legislators, not executives. 
C. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right Under the First Amendment 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that they suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right in 
the form of a violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech.  First Amendment 
cases involving social media address many issues.  Some of these issues have already 
been addressed by Judge Whelan’s order on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
including but not limited to his conclusions that: (1) Plaintiffs have standing to bring their 
claims; (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) Defendants’ accounts 
































are designated public forums.  ECF No. 42.  As noted, the Court adopts those conclusions 
here.3  Other potentially relevant issues, such as whether a plaintiff can require a 
defendant to listen to their speech—she cannot, see Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. 
Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) (a plaintiff has “no constitutional right to 
force the government to listen to their views”)—are addressed by other cases but have not 
been raised on the facts here.4 
Instead, this dispute addresses an apparent issue of first impression in the digital 
domain: whether Plaintiffs’ repetitive comments and replies on Defendants’ social media 
pages actually disrupted Defendants’ original posts, making Defendants’ blocking a 
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on Plaintiffs’ speech.  As outlined below, 
the Court concludes that while the blocking was content-neutral, Defendants’ continued 
blocking constitutes a burden on speech that is no longer narrowly tailored to serve a 
substantial government interest.   
1. Defendants’ Blocking was a Content-Neutral Rule of Decorum 
Having concluded Defendants’ pages are public forums and that they acted under 
color of state law in maintaining those pages, the Court turns to whether the blocking at 
                                               
3  Whether Defendants’ accounts remain a public forum today is a close question.  It 
is undisputed that the government may close a designated public forum.  See DiLoreto v. 
Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The government has 
an inherent right to control its property, which includes the right to close a previously 
open forum.”).  Since the Complaint was filed, Facebook introduced the word filter 
feature and Defendants have started using word filters extensively to attempt to block all 
comments.  It may be that by doing so Defendants closed the public forums on their 
public Facebook pages.  However, the Parties did not brief and the Court is not aware of 
any authority holding that a social media public forum is closed when broad word filters 
are used.  These are simply uncharted seas with plenty of icebergs.  To proceed 
circumspectly, the Court does not make that holding here, but notes the difficulty of 
applying First Amendment analysis to technology platforms that change rapidly during a 
single case. 
4  Plaintiffs’ also briefly touch on the issue of “hiding” and deleting comments, but 
do not argue these actions constituted a violation of Section 1983.  Accordingly, those 
actions are not analyzed in these conclusions of law. 
































issue here was content-based or content-neutral because “[v]iewpoint discrimination is 
prohibited in all forums.”  Faison, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (citing Int'l Soc. for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)).  Thus, if Defendants’ blocking 
was content-based, it would be subject to strict scrutiny.  Alternatively, if Defendants’ 
blocking was content-neutral, the Court would analyze whether the blocking constituted 
“reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech” under the 
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.  491 U.S. 
781, 791 (1989). 
“Viewpoint discrimination is apparent . . . if a government official's decision to 
take a challenged action was ‘impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a 
particular point of view.’” Davison, 912 F.3d at 687 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812–13 (1985)).  By contrast, a 
regulation on speech is “content-neutral” if it is “justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.  “A regulation that serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect 
on some speakers or messages but not others.”  Id. 
Plaintiffs argue Defendants’ blocking was content-based because their social media 
comments “were addressing what even Defendants acknowledged to be serious, 
persistent, legitimate PUSD issues.”  Pls.’ Br., ECF No. 86, 4.  Defendants’ counter that 
they blocked Plaintiffs “because of the ‘manner’ [i.e., the repetition] of the posting and 
not because of the content of the posts.”  Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 84, 4. 
The evidence presented at trial favors Defendants.  To begin with, it is undisputed 
that Defendants’ did not adopt formal rules of decorum or etiquette for their social media 
pages.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 115:6-9; 154:21-23.  However, to survive a challenge that 
their decision to block Plaintiffs’ was content-based (and thus subject to strict scrutiny – 
see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988), Defendants’ necessarily argue that the 
blocking was to enforce an unwritten rule of decorum prohibiting repetitious speech on 
their social media pages. 
































In Defendants’ favor, there is ample testimony that once Facebook introduced the 
word filter feature, Defendants intended their pages to be “bulletin boards” and tried to 
block all comments on their pages.  Plaintiffs’ repetitive posting was also clearly 
established by the evidence at trial.  Christopher Garnier sent 226 tweets to O’Connor-
Ratcliff in the span of ten minutes on October 17, 2017, sending each tweet as a reply to 
every tweet she ever posted.  On Facebook, Plaintiffs repeatedly posted comments – 
though not all were identical – to both Defendants’ pages.  This evidence distinguishes 
the case at bar from others addressing First Amendment challenges to social media 
blocking, which did not involve repeated comments and acknowledged the blocking in 
those cases was content-based.  Cf. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. 
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Defendants do ‘not contest 
Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Individual Plaintiffs were blocked from the President’s 
Twitter account because the Individual Plaintiffs posted tweets that criticized the 
President or his policies’”) and Davison, 912 F.3d at 687 (defendant county board chair 
blocked plaintiff “because she viewed the allegations [in his Facebook comments] as 
‘slanderous’”). 
However, O’Connor-Ratcliff’s testimony also describes interacting with 
constituents on Facebook who had nice things to say by either replying to their comments 
or responding through an emoticon.  The documentary evidence further indicates that 
while Zane may have intended his page to be a “bulletin board” and only deleted 
Plaintiffs’ comments because “that’s not what I wanted for my page,” other positive 
comments remained on his page when the suit was originally filed.  For example, Zane 
made an original post on June 29, 2017, on which it appears the official PUSD Facebook 
account made a comment.  Pls.’ Ex. 6, 5-6.  That positive comment was still visible on 
the date the screenshot was taken, September 8, 2017.  Id.  Thus, at least when the suit 
was filed, there is strong evidence these pages were not “bulletin boards.”5 
                                               
5  As discussed above in note 3, the Court declines to hold that Defendants’ later use of extensive 
word filters here effectively closed the public forum.  If the public forum was now closed, it would moot 
































On this record, the evidence shows that Defendants’ blocked Plaintiffs due to the 
repetitive manner of their posts, vice the negative content of those posts.  Accordingly, 
the Court concludes Defendants’ blocking was content-neutral. 
One final note on content-neutrality is appropriate.  Both parties argue that 
Facebook and Twitter’s community standards support their claims.  Defendants assert 
that Plaintiffs’ comments violated those community standards by “engag[ing] with 
content at very high frequencies.”  Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 84, 8.  Plaintiffs respond that 
O’Connor-Ratcliff attempted to bring these posts to Facebook’s attention, but that 
Facebook took no action against them.  Pls.’ Br., ECF No. 86, 11, n. 14.  Plaintiffs argue 
Facebook’s inaction confirms Plaintiffs’ posts did not violate Facebook’s community 
standards, and therefore, the comments should be considered protected speech.  Id.  
Notably missing from these arguments, however, is citation to authority approving the 
use of Facebook or Twitter’s community standards in analyzing whether the First 
Amendment is infringed.  The Court declines the invitation to do so here.  The First 
Amendment is interpreted by the courts, not tech companies.  Cf. Prager Univ. v. Google, 
LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (state action doctrine precluded First Amendment 
scrutiny of YouTube’s content moderation policy pursuant to its terms of service and 
community guidelines). 
2. Defendants’ blocking is no longer narrowly tailored 
Having found the blocking to be content-neutral, the Court next turns to whether 
Defendants’ blocking and use of word filters are narrowly tailored.  Plaintiffs argue 
Defendants’ blocking was not narrowly tailored because their comments did not “disrupt, 
disturb, or otherwise impede” Defendants’ social media pages.  Pls.’ Br., ECF No. 86, 
13-14 (citing White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990)).  
Defendants argue that because they intended to use their pages in a “bulletin board type 
                                               
Plaintiffs’ claims.  See Karras v. Gore, Case No. 14-CV-2564-BEN-KSC, 2015 WL 74143, at *3-4 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015) (denying as moot the plaintiff’s request for an injunction allowing him to post 
on the defendant’s public Facebook page where the defendant had already closed the page). 
































manner,” the use of expansive word filters to attempt to block all comments supports the 
conclusion that Defendants’ blocking was narrowly tailored.  Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 84, 11.  
While the Court concludes Defendants’ blocking was initially narrowly tailored, the fact 
that blocking has gone on for nearly three years requires the Court to reach a different 
conclusion now. 
To be “narrowly tailored,” a regulation “need not be the least restrictive or least 
intrusive means” of serving “the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests.”  
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.  “[T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the 
. . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.”  Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 
675, 689 (1985)).  However, “this standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner 
regulation may burden substantially more speech that is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interests.”  Id.   
In the physical world, the Ninth Circuit has held that a city council may remove a 
person from a meeting without offending the First Amendment “when someone making a 
proscribed remark is acting in a way that actually disturbs or impedes the meeting.”  
White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990).  The city ordinance at 
issue there provided that an offending individual must first be provided a warning before 
persistent disrupting action could result in ejection from the meeting and a misdemeanor 
citation.  Id.  The court elaborated that “the nature of a [c]ouncil meeting means that a 
speaker can become ‘disruptive’ in ways that would not meet the test of an actual breach 
of the peace.”  Id.  “A speaker may disrupt a [c]ouncil meeting by speaking too long, by 
being unduly repetitious, or by extended discussion of irrelevancies.”  Id. at 1426.  While 
“the point at which speech becomes unduly repetitious or largely irrelevant is not 
mathematically determinable,” the test is whether the city council “is prevented from 
accomplishing business in a reasonably efficient manner.”  Id.  The court also 
emphasized that “such conduct might interfere with the rights of other speakers.”  Id. 
In Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, the Ninth Circuit addressed another case involving 
































an individual who was ejected from a city council meeting for giving a silent Nazi salute 
to the city council mocking a decision the council had made.  629 F.3d 966, 969-70 (9th 
Cir. 2010).  Though the text of the ordinance does not appear in the court’s opinion, it is 
clear from the opinion that the plaintiff never received an indefinite ban from city council 
meetings.  Indeed, he sought leave to amend his complaint two years after it was initially 
filed to add another ejection for a subsequent alleged disruption.   Id. at 970.  Addressing 
the plaintiff’s disruption, the Ninth Circuit explained that White stands for the proposition 
that “[a]ctual disruption means actual disruption.”  629 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc).  “It does not mean constructive disruption, technical disruption, virtual disruption, 
nunc pro tunc disruption, or imaginary disruption.”  Id.  The Court remanded for trial the 
issue of whether the plaintiff’s actions constituted an actual disruption.  Id. at 978. 
While, “as a general matter, social media is entitled to the same First Amendment 
protections as other forms of media,” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 
1735-36 (2019), the Court notes that applying the First Amendment to social media is a 
relatively new task.  Accordingly, it “proceed[s] circumspectly, taking one step at a 
time.”  Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring).  Thus, the Court applies the narrow tailoring 
test articulated in Ward, while acknowledging the “actual disruption” standard in White 
and Norse, which have not been applied outside the context of a city council meeting.  
On Facebook, Plaintiffs’ repeatedly posted the same or similar comments at high 
frequency during a short period of time.  Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 68:13-15.  While 
Plaintiffs’ comments on posts appeared beneath Defendants’ original content, Facebook 
truncated long posts, and comments such that only an interested reader would see the 
entirety of a lengthy comment, blocking promoted the legitimate interest of facilitating 
discussion on these social media pages and did not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary because it immediately responded to high frequency posting during a short 
period of time.  See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.  Alternatively, applying the “unduly 
repetitious or largely irrelevant” threshold the Ninth Circuit articulated in White, 
Plaintiffs’ comments surely also met this standard.  900 F.2d at 1426.  In other words, at 
































the time Defendants’ blocked Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ repetitive comments on Defendants’ 
Facebook posts were narrowly-tailored grounds for ejection from the forum. 
On Twitter, the reasonableness of O’Connor-Ratcliff’s initial decision to block 
Christopher Garnier is even more apparent.  The testimony received shows that 
Christopher Garnier “tweeted at” O’Connor-Ratcliff 226 times in less than ten minutes.  
Trial Tr., ECF No. 80, 180:16.  While the Court concurs with Christopher Garnier that it 
“is a beautiful thing [to be] able to engage [] elected officials’ social media pages,” id. at 
76:19-20, this repetitive posting is far from “the banter” he asserts it is, id. at 76:24.  
Instead, O’Connor-Ratcliff’s blocking of Christopher Garnier was narrowly tailored 
because it constituted a very limited blocking induced only by an excessive “Tweet 
storm.”  While this conclusion differs from other social media cases, it does so because 
those cases did not address repetitive posts.   Alternatively applying White’s “actual 
disruption” standard, Christopher Garnier’s tweets once again crossed the line into 
“unduly repetitious or largely irrelevant.”  900 F.2d at 1426.  Accordingly, the Court 
finds O’Connor-Ratcliff initially ejecting Christopher Garnier from her Twitter forum for 
narrowly tailored reasons. 
The issue then becomes whether Defendants’ continued blocking, which has now 
gone on for more than three years, continues to “‘promote[] a substantial government 
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 
799 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689)).  Here, the Court concludes the blocking has run 
its course – for now. 
In White and Norse, the respective city councils both eventually allowed the 
plaintiffs into subsequent meetings.  Not so here.  Defendants continue to block Plaintiffs 
more than three years after initially doing so.  While blocking was initially permissible, 
its continuation applies a regulation on speech substantially more broadly than necessary 
to achieve the government interest.  See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.  Requiring Defendants to 
unblock Plaintiffs’ following a three-year ban is also consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in White, which held the city ordinance at issue to be valid because it could be 
































applied in a permissible manner.  See 900 F.2d at 1426.  Accordingly, the Court finds 
Defendants’ blocking is no longer narrowly tailored. 
However, the Court’s conclusion is not free reign for Plaintiffs’ to repeatedly post 
on Defendants’ social media pages again.  As noted above, the Court finds Defendants’ 
initial blocking decision responded to repetitive and largely unreasonable behavior, and 
was therefore narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest.  See Ward, 
491 U.S. at 799.  Only the fact that the blocking has gone on for three years requires the 
Court to intervene here.  Plaintiffs should not interpret these conclusions of law as an 
invitation to flaunt and mock the First Amendment’s important protections. 
3. Substantial Government Interest 
Having found the blocking is no longer narrowly tailored, Plaintiffs are entitled to 
the injunctive relief they request.  Nonetheless, the Court turns to whether Defendants’ 
blocking furthered a significant government interest because of the important 
consequences the Court’s ruling may have here. 
It is undeniable that Defendants, by creating and maintaining public Facebook 
pages and Twitter accounts, serve a substantial government interest.  They have 
leveraged technology to provide new ways for their constituents to gain awareness of 
their activities and initiatives as elected officials.  In short, they have used their pages to 
facilitate transparency in government.  This is one of the most “significant government 
interests” the Court could imagine.  Ensuring those platforms are not cluttered with 
repetitive posts monopolizing the pixels on the screen is important, and their role as 
“moderator[s] involves a great deal of discretion.”  White, 900 F.2d at 1426.  It is a 
challenging role, but one that public officials should not be scared away from as they 
seek to increase the public’s access to themselves and their offices. 
For these reasons, the Court notes that Defendants could adopt content-neutral 
rules of decorum for their pages to further the substantial government interest of 
promoting online interaction with constituents through social media.  For example, those 
rules could contain reasonable restrictions prohibiting the repeated posting of comments 
































and include sanctions such as blocking for a limited period of time.  Though the Court 
cannot decide a precise time limit that might be reasonable, blocking for one month may 
pass muster given the ease at which a page administrator can block and unblock a user 
from a particular page.  Blocking for three years, on the other hand, cannot. 
4. Alternative Channels of Communication Exist 
Again, while the foregoing is sufficient to grant Plaintiffs their requested injunctive 
relief, the Court briefly addresses the final factor in the Ward analysis.  491 U.S. at 802.  
Defendants argue that their decision to block Plaintiffs on social media left open “ample 
alternative channels for communication.”  Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 84, 12.   
Ample alternative channels for communication exist when a regulation “does not 
attempt to ban any particular manner or type of expression at a given place or time.”  
Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.  “An alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to 
reach the intended audience.”  Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 
1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs do not argue that ample alternatives are lacking, and the evidence 
confirms this is a wise concession.  Whether Plaintiffs’ intended audience for their 
comments and replies was Defendants themselves or other constituents within PUSD, 
Plaintiffs are able to communicate their concerns through Board meetings, emails, and 
their own social media accounts.  Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants’ blocking 
does not offend the third step of the Ward analysis. 
5. Prior Restraint 
Based on the foregoing, the Court need not reach the thorny question of whether an 
expansive use of word filters designed to block every comment constitutes an 
impermissible prior restraint on protected speech or whether it closes the public forum.  
“A prior restraint is an administrative or judicial order that forbids certain 
communications issued before those communications occur.”  Greater Los Angeles 
Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 430 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 549-50 (1993)).  “Any prior restraint on 
































expression comes to [the Court] with a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity,” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (internal quotations 
omitted).  As discussed above, “social media is entitled to the same First Amendment 
protections as other forms of media,” Packingham, 137 S.Ct. at 1735-36 (2019), but the 
Court again “proceed[s] circumspectly, taking one step at a time.”  Id. at 1744 (Alito, J., 
concurring).  That caution counsels the Court against making a finding regarding word 
filters here, when the Court can decide the issue on narrower grounds. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court is aware of the consequences of its ruling today, but it is bound to 
follow the law as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  It may be that, faced with the choice between unblocking Plaintiffs and closing 
their public pages entirely, Defendants choose the latter.  That would be a sad conclusion.  
The actions of a few repetitive actors should not deprive so many of this important civic 
tool, and the Court hopes that Defendants do not choose this course of action. 
The Court finds that based on the record and the applicable law, Plaintiffs have 
proven Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving Plaintiffs of their right to free 
speech while acting under color of state law.  Specifically, the violation began at some 
time late in 2017 when the blocking of Plaintiffs had continued for too long a time and 
continues to the present.  The Court does not find Defendants’ conduct violated the 
California Constitution.  Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief on their 
Section 1983 claim.  Judgment will be entered accordingly.   
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Date: January 14, 2021    __________________________________ 
       HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ 
       United States District Judge  
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